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Abstract
A cornerstone in 1nance theory continues to be the positive relationship between risk and return in spite of Fama and French
(The Journal of Finance 47(2) (1992) 427–65) and several later papers 1nding no relationship between the two variables.
Twelve years earlier, Bowman (Sloan Management Review 1980, pp. 17–31) studied the same relationship from organization
theory, achieving similar results with accounting data, and developing a whole research stream known as “Bowman’s paradox”.
This stream has contributed to some curious and interesting ideas that could also be applied to other di<erent streams: new
risk measures, managerial goal selection, response to the decline in the organization, diversi1cation strategy on risk and
return, among others. Similar to the 1nancial stream, a number of researchers have tried to study this issue from the strategic
management perspective. Their inconclusive results have generated a considerable controversy, keeping this research stream
alive. In this work, we describe and explore this phenomenon from “Bowman’s paradox”, theoretical explanations, criticisms
and future orientations. ? 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A cornerstone in 1nance theory is the positive relation-
ship between risk and return [3, p. 244]. This relationship
arises mainly from a risk-averse reasoning: people will not
support higher risk for the same level of return; they will
only accept higher risk if they get a higher return. This rela-
tionship has been widely tested with 1nancial data from the
stock market, using the beta of capital assets pricing model
(CAPM) as the risk measure, and the results achieved are
contradictory. Until the work by Fama and French [1], most
research had obtained a signi1cant positive relationship, as
the CAPM theory postulates. From Fama and French [1] on-
wards, a new research stream in 1nancial economics, known
as “the death of beta” has arisen [4,5], which includes tests
that have reported positive, negative or no correlation at all
between return and beta (e.g., [3,6,7]). This new research
stream is therefore challenging some of the more established
assumptions in 1nancial economics.
Twelve years before Fama and French’s paper [1], Bow-
man [2] studied the same relationship from organization the-
ory, achieving similar results with accounting data; that is
to say, a negative slope between risk and return. From this
work, another totally independent research stream, known
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Fig. 1. Works that cited Bowman’s paradox articles, from 1992 to
2000.
as Bowman’s paradox has arisen because, at that time, it
went against the established 1nancial economics tenet. This
paradox implies that managers accept higher risk at the
same time that they expect lower returns. To date, similar
to the 1nancial stream, a number of researchers have tried
to study this issue from the strategic management focus.
They obtained inconclusive results that have generated a
considerable controversy that continues with no consensus
emerging [8, p. 330].
The importance of this research stream is demonstrated
by the key issues that management scholars are currently
studying. These originate in the works that described this
paradoxical relationship, and whose ideas can also be ap-
plied to di<erent streams. For instance, since the traditional
risk measures (e.g. beta) present problems, it is possible to
use measures of strategic risk speci1cally developed by this
stream [9]. The research on other interesting topics, such as
managerial goal selection, the response to the decline in the
organizations, the inMuence of the diversi1cation strategy on
risk and return, or the relationship between accounting and
market variables, has also been enhanced by these works.
An intuitive idea of the depth of Bowman’s paradox can
be obtained through Fig. 1, which shows the number of
works that cite all the articles reviewed in this survey be-
tween 1992 and 2000. Among these papers we 1nd both
works about Bowman’s paradox and papers that, from out-
side this line of thought, rest on it to develop some feature
of their own theories. In Fig. 1 we can see that, although
the maximum interest in this topic was reached in 1996 and
1997, there is a clearly global positive trend, and the number
of works continue to increase. (See Appendix A for speci1c
analysis by paper.)
We think that it is important to review this literature for
several reasons: (1) There is at present considerable contro-
versy because of the contradictions, gaps, and inconsisten-
cies in this literature. Thus, as there is no agreement between
researchers of this topic, it is interesting to study in depth the
problems that prevent this consensus. (2) Although there are
signi1cant di<erences between Beta’s death and Bowman’s
paradox streams, both pursue the same goal: the relation be-
tween risk and return. Nevertheless, in the whole literature
of Beta’s death there is no citation of Bowman’s paradox.
If we assume that the 1nancial stream is successful at this
time [10], that is, that the beta as measure of market risk
has failed [11], we can see why 1nancial scholars are look-
ing for new risk measures, mainly from accounting [12,33].
In this sense, we think that it is possible that in the very
near future both streams will achieve their results together. 1
(3) Although we are discussing accounting measures, there
are only citations from 1nancial and organization theories.
Accounting research could add a valuable new focus, and
contribute with its own tenet about more sophisticated risk
measures, as in the case of Kim and Ismail [12].
For these reasons, we agree with RueMi [9] that: “an im-
portant step would be to examine and reexamine the na-
ture of the risk–return relationships for the various samples
examined.”
In this paper, the literature about the relationship between
risk and return is reviewed. The targets are to de1ne and
clarify the relationship through this literature, summarize
previous investigations in order to inform the reader of the
state of current research, identify relations and inconsisten-
cies between (and inside) di<erent theories, and suggest new
openings for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the sur-
vey structure is explained, distinguishing between the two
main groups of studies: theoretical explanations and empir-
ical criticisms. Second, the works included in the 1rst group
are surveyed according to their theoretical backgrounds.
Third, the main criticisms made about the empirical research
of the paradox are reviewed. Finally, we extract some con-
clusions from the literature examined, with special men-
tion of those research foci that are still to be addressed in
depth.
2. General focus on accounting relationship:
organization theory
Some works before Bowman [2] tested the relationship
between return and risk with accounting measures, 1nding
a theoretical positive relationship or no signi1cant relation-
ship. These works are presented in Table 1. It was Bowman
[2] who 1rst pointed out the paradoxical negative relation-
ship. From this initial work, a new research stream grew,
centered on the risk–return relationship using accounting
variables. The objective of this work is a review of the lit-
erature from the discovery of the paradox, and, therefore, it
will be centered on those articles that have tested this rela-
tionship from Bowman’s pioneer work.
1 To date, only four papers simultaneously investigate the risk–
return relationship in 1nancial and organizational terms, always
from management literature [13–15,9].
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Table 1
Empirical risk–return papers before Bowman [2]
Researchers Measures Sample Results
Return Risk Firms Industries Source Period Relationship
Conrad and ROA ROA 763 59 Compustat 1950–1965 Positive
Plotkin [16] dispersion
Fisher and ROA ROA variance Not 11 Not 1950–1964 Signi1cant positive at
Hall [17] and skewness mentioned mentioned 1rm and industry level
Hurdle [18] Stockholder Absolute devi- 231 85 Sheperd 1960–1969 Signi1cant positive
pro1tability ation of return
measure
Armour and ROE ROE variance 28 1 Fortune 500 1955–1973 Not signi1cant negative
Teece [19]
Bowman [2] ROE ROE variance 387 11 Value Line 1955–1973 Negative at 1rm level,
1572 85 1968–1976 no signi1cant at industry level
Two main research themes can be addressed as they apply
to the study of “Bowman’s paradox”. The 1rst is composed
of those works that assume the possibility of a negative risk–
return relationship, hypothesizing this relationship from their
theoretical backgrounds. In other words, they are works that
justify the paradox theoretically. The second is composed of
works that address the methodological mistakes present in
the previous studies. For these studies, these methodologi-
cal problems condition the acceptance of the negative risk–
return relationship. Within the studies that follow the 1rst
guideline, there are two main points of view from which the
paradox is explained [20, p. 271]: (1) the decision-maker
behavior toward risk, which is studied mainly from prospect
theory [21] and behavioral theory [22]; (2) the privileges of
the strategic position of the 1rm. In this group of studies, is-
sues such as the diversi1cation strategy [23,24], the market
power [25] or the negative e<ects of the historic risk on the
return [26,14,27] are related to the risk–return association.
For the studies that follow the second theme, we address
the criticisms that several researchers have stated about the
sample, measures, and statistical methodology followed in
the 1rst group of studies.
An overview of the theories that attempt to explain the
negative relationship and the main criticisms about the em-
pirical research will be presented to facilitate future research
about the paradox. Following the example of Bruno Latour’s
diagrams [28], Fig. 2 shows the structure of these groups
of studies.
The arrows have the following explanations: (a) arrows
pointing to the circle represent agreement with Bowman’s
paradox; (b) arrows pointing away from the circle indicate
that the researcher(s) dissents from Bowman’s conclusions;
and (c) arrows pointing in both directions, joining the circle
with some researcher(s) indicate that this study has been
undertaken by some component of Bowman’s investigation
team.
3. Theoretical explanations in organization theory
Those researchers who assume the existence of a nega-
tive relationship between return and risk with accounting
measures have sought to explain such a relationship through
certain theories. These works can be grouped into two types:
the decision-maker behavior towards risk and the strategic
position of the 1rm.
3.1. Management behavior towards risk
Decision theory accepts three attitudes towards risk [29,
p. 72]: (1) risk averse: investments with less risk will be
preferred at the same expected return level. (2) risk seek-
ing: investments with higher risk will be preferred at the
same expected return level. These decision makers will
assume higher risk because they will get higher probabil-
ity of reaching extraordinary returns because of the high
variance values. (3) risk neutral: the higher expected re-
turn investment will be selected, independent of its risk
level.
Although these three behaviors have been acknowledged,
risk aversion has been a constant in the investment selec-
tion models [21, p. 264], [30, p. 5], [58, p. 11]. This risk
aversion leads to a positive relationship between return and
risk: risk-averse decision makers will choose high-risk al-
ternatives only if they also o<er high expected values [58,
p. 11]. If the decision maker was risk seeking, the relation-
ship between risk and return would be negative. Now, both
high return and high risk will increase the utility of the sub-
ject. If two alternatives o<er the same expected return, that
which o<ers higher risk will be preferred, because it will
allow higher probability of extraordinary returns. Hence, a
lower pro1tability investment will not be selected unless it
o<ers a high variance too; that is to say, if we decrease the
expected return, it is because we are also increasing the risk.
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THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
Bowman (1982) [31]
Bettis and Hall (1982) [23]
Bowman (1984) [32]
Bettis and Mahajan (1985) [24]
Singh (1986) [41]
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) [34]
Cool , Dierickx and Jemison (1989) [25]
Chang and Thomas (1989) [20]
Fiegenbaum (1990) [35]
Miller and Bromiley (1990) [26]
Jegers (1991) [36]
Bromiley (1991) [42]
Miller and Leiblein (1996) [45]
Greve (1998) [43]
Kim, Hwang and Burgers (1993) [52]
Sinha (1994) [37]
Gooding, Goel and Wiseman (1996) [38]
Lee (1997) [39]
Lehner (2000) [40]
Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) [46]
Wiseman and Catanach (1997) [47]
Palmer and Wiseman (1999) [48]
Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) [27]
Conrad and Plotkin (1968) [16]
Fisher and Hall (1969) [17]
Hurdle (1974) [18]
Armour and Teece (1978) [19]
Marsh and Swanson (1984) [54]
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985) [55]
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986) [13]
Aaker and Jacobson (1987) [56]
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) [57]
Oviatt and Bauerschmidt (1991) [58]
Wiseman and Bromiley (1991) [59]
Collins and Ruefli (1992) [60]
Baucus, Golec and Cooper (1993) [61]
Walls and Dyer (1996) [62]
McNamara and Bromiley (1999) [8]
Amit and Livnat (1988) [51]
CRITICISMS
PREVIOUS WORKS TO BOWMAN (1980) [2]
Bowman
(1980)
[2]
Fig. 2. Survey structure.
A risk-averse behavior leads to a positive relationship be-
tween risk and return, and a risk-seeking behavior leads to a
negative relationship. As Bowman [2] found a negative re-
lationship between accounting risk and accounting return, it
makes the traditional assumption about risk-averse behav-
ior questionable. However, as a constant risk-seeking be-
havior is “rather unlikely and contrary to most economic
thought” [2, p. 25], the risk preference could change; that is
to say, be dependent on the context of a choice [58, p. 5].
Thus, in some circumstances, individuals can be risk averse
and, in other circumstances, can be risk seeking or risk
neutral.
Two theories that assume this changeable behavior have
been used to explain the “Bowman’s paradox”. These theo-
ries are “Prospect Theory” [21] from economic theory, and
“Behavioral Theory” [22] from organizational theory.
3.1.1. Prospect theory
This theory was developed to explain some empirical re-
sults that contradict the traditional expected return theory.
One of the main propositions of prospect theory points out
the key role of the reference point or target for de1ning the
decision maker’s attitude towards risk. When the expected
results of an alternative are “good” — that is to say, they are
higher than the target level — the decision maker shows a
risk-averse attitude. When the expected results are “bad” —
lower than the target level — the decision maker will be risk
seeking. High expected results lead to a risk-averse attitude
and, therefore, a positive risk–return relationship, while low
expected results lead to a risk-seeking attitude and, hence,
a negative relationship. Prospect theory also points out that
this second relationship will be steeper than the 1rst [21,
p. 280].
Though prospect theory was developed to explain individ-
ual decision-making, some researchers [31,32,34–36] con-
sider that prospect theory postulates can also be applied to
organizational decision-making. Such postulates are trans-
lated in a double relationship between risk and return: those
1rms that have reached their target levels (high return 1rms)
will show risk-averse behavior; those 1rms that have not
reached their target levels (low return 1rms) will be risk
seeking. Then, the former 1rms will show a positive rela-
tionship between risk and return, and the latter, a negative
relationship.
Fig. 3 shows the graphic relationship between risk and
return [34, p. 98].
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Fig. 3. Prospect theory’s hypothesis and risk–return relationship.
The upper 1gure corresponds to a sample where most
1rms have reached the target level. Therefore, the relation-
ship between risk and return for these 1rms is positive. Fewer
1rms have not reached the target level, presenting a nega-
tive slope relationship. However, for the whole sample, the
obtained relationship is positive.
The lower 1gure presents the opposite: most 1rms have
not reached the target level, so these 1rms present a nega-
tive risk-return relationship. Fewer 1rms present a positive
relationship and their position is above the target. Overall,
the stronger negative relationship makes the whole sample
relationship negative.
Hence, this theory can explain both positive and negative
relations between risk and return for the whole sample.
Table 2 shows the works that have tried to test Bow-
man’s paradox through Prospect Theory with these two hy-
potheses: (1) low performers show a negative risk–return
relationship, and (2) high performers show a positive risk–
return relationship. These studies divide the sample into two
sub-samples — high and low performers — based on the re-
turn values and the target value. Therefore, if a 1rm’s return
is lower than the target value, it will be a low performer;
otherwise, it will be a high performer. The selected target is
usually some central measure of the return of the industry
(e.g., the mean of the median of the industry returns).
Most empirical works [20,31,34–36] support the two hy-
potheses: low performers show a negative relationship be-
tween risk and return, and high performers show a positive
relationship. Besides, Chang and Thomas [20] found a curvi-
linear relationship between risk and return, and Fiegenbaum
[35] obtained that the low-performers’ regression slope was
steeper than the high performers, according to prospect the-
ory hypothesis [21, p. 280].
Though empirical tests support these hypotheses, some
problems are evident:
1. Prospect theory describes the individual behavior but, in
these tests, is used as a theory that describes organiza-
tional behavior.
2. There are some problems with the de1nition of the tar-
get level. Most researchers assume that the target level
is the same for all 1rms in an industry, setting the in-
dustry average or median of returns as the target level.
Nevertheless, prospect theory posits the status quo of a
1rm’s performance and not the industry average as the
reference point [39, p. 62]. Therefore, the reference point
seems to be 1rm speci1c, and it can be an error to con-
sider it common for all 1rms in the sample. This problem
will be discussed further in behavioral theory.
3. Most of these studies are cross-sectional in design, so
do not decisively reject the possibility that the varia-
tion in risk taking across organizations stems from estab-
lished di<erences among them [58, p. 6]. Furthermore,
the risk attitude can be considered 1rm speci1c, which
makes the use of cross-sectional analyses inappropri-
ate. As a solution, some authors have used 1rm-speci1c
longitudinal models [39,40], reaching similar results to
cross-sectional works.
4. Finally, most of the studies have related the 1rm risk level
to the performance level, while prospect theory links the
risk attitude to the performance level. This treatment im-
plicitly assumes that the risk experienced by the 1rm is
the risk the decision maker desired [39, p. 62]. This as-
sumption presents two problems: (a) it implies that the
decision maker has perfect knowledge of performance in
the future [39, p. 62], and (b) it is assumed that all the
risk of the 1rm is a consequence of the decision maker’s
attitude. To avoid this problem, some authors have tried
to measure the managerial risk attitude [32,41,39], 1nd-
ing support for prospect theory hypotheses.
3.1.2. Behavioral theory
Behavioral theory [22] is the second theory that explains
the paradox from the attitude towards risk showed by the
1rms, and it leads to similar hypotheses to prospect theory.
With this focus, 1rms are described as large systems of
standard operating procedures, where managers take deci-
sions based on two di<erent measures: the performance level
they aspire to (aspirations), and the performance level they
expect (expectations) [42, p. 39]. Thus, managers will dif-
ferentiate between two kinds of outcomes: failures and suc-
cess outcomes [43, p. 61]. The 1rst ones will be those out-
comes lower than the aspiration level, while the second will
be those higher than the aspiration level.
According to this theory, the amount of risk managers will
accept will depend on the expected performance in relation
to the aspiration [43, p. 59]. When the expected performance
is higher than the aspiration, managers consider that the 1rm
is performing well, so no change is needed. If managers
expect performance to fall below the aspiration level, creat-
ing a gap between aspirations and performance suScient to
create a sense of crisis, a major organizational change in the
1rm will be needed [44, p. 136] to 1nd new procedures and
techniques that increase the performance. This change
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Table 2
Focus on prospect theory
Researchers Measures Sample Results
Return Risk Target Firms Industries Source Period Relationship
Bowman [31] ROE Content analysis Bottom quartile as low
performers, top quar-
tile as high performers
155
3 Value Line 1979 Negative for 1rms, but not
signi1cant for industries
Bowman [32] ROE Content analysis Bottom quartile as low
performers, top quar-
tile as high performers
26
1 Value Line 1972–1981 No risk inMuence on future
performance. Negative inMu-
ence of performance on fu-
ture risk. Signi1cant support
for prospect theory
Fiegenbaum and
Thomas [34]
ROE ROE variance Median industry
ROE
2322 47 Compustat 1960–1979 Positive for 1rms above the
target; negative for 1rms be-
low target. Signi1cant support
for prospect theory
Chang and
Thomas [20]
ROA (ROA)2 ROA variance Not mentioned
64
Not
mentioned
Compustat I and II
Census of Manufac-
turing
1977–1981 Curvilinear risk–return rela-
tionship observed. Signi1cant
support for prospect theory
Miller and
Bromiley [26]
ROE ROA Income variabi-
lity, market risk
and strategic risk
Mean industry
ROE and ROA
746 526 Not
mentioned
Compustat and
C.R.S.P.
1978–1982
1983–1987
No suport for prospect theory
hypotheses
Fiegenbaum [35] ROA ROA variance Median of industry
ROA
3300 85 Compustat 1977–1984 Positive for 1rms above the
target; negative for 1rms be-
low the target. Signi1cant
support for prospect theory
Jegers [36] ROE ROA cash
Mow= capital cash
Mow plus interests
over assets
Variance and coeS-
cient of variation
of return measures
Median of industry 3250 110 Belgium National
Bank
1977–1982 Positive for 1rms above the
target; negative for 1rms be-
low the target. Signi1cant
support for prospect theory
Sinha [37] ROA Standard deviation
of ROA
Median return of
the industry 341
14 Centre for Research
in Finance database
of the Annual Report
Record
1977–1985 Negative and signi1cant be-
low median; weak and posi-
tive above the median
Gooding
et al. [38]
ROE Standard deviation
of ROE
Obtained from
the minimal level
of risk
Between 1405
and 5107
Between
29 and 45
Compustat 1970–1974
1975–1979
1980–1984
1985–1989
Signi1cant support for the
positive quadratic relation-
ship. Denies the 1xed refer-
ence point
Lee [39] ROE and
market share
Content analysis Previous year
performance
6 1 Annual reports and
Compustat
Di<erent for
each 1rm
Performance change has a
negative inMuence in risk
Lehner [40] ROE Absolute di<erence
between ROEt and
ROEt−1
Identi1cated by the
minimal level of risk
876 14 Compustat 1972–1991 Empirically, the relative posi-
tion to the reference level ex-
plains the risk–return relation-
ship better than the change in
enviromental conditions
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involves risk for the 1rm, because the consequences of
change are usually less well known than the consequences
of the status quo [43, p. 58]. Finally, if no solution is found,
managers will be forced to set lower aspirations.
By linking performance with pro1tability, behavioral the-
ory generates two hypotheses: (1) low performers — those
whose expectations fall below the aspiration level — will
undertake a risky organizational change resulting in a neg-
ative inMuence of return over risk; (2) high performers —
those whose expectations are above the aspiration level —
do not increase risk, and, therefore, their risk–return rela-
tionship will be positive.
Table 3 shows the empirical research relating to the para-
dox under this focus. All of the studies obtained strong sup-
port for these hypotheses.
Although prospect theory and behavioral theory hypothe-
ses relating to a risk–return relationship are similar, there
are some di<erences: (1) behavioral theory makes postulates
about the 1rm’s behavior, while prospect theory studies in-
dividual behavior; (2) in behavioral theory, the risk–return
relationship is de1ned not only by the attitude towards risk,
but also by some 1rm characteristics — mainly, organiza-
tional slack. The role played by these slack resources needs
to be more properly de1ned, as both theoretical hypotheses
and the empirical results are contradictory.
These works present some common problems with
prospect theory. The 1rst is the de1nition of the target or
reference point. Many authors [26,34–36] have used the
median of the performance of the sector as the reference
point, but the assumption of a common target point for all
1rms in the industry does not seem likely. Other works
[42,45,43,46] address this problem and use the previous
performance as a target, especially for those 1rms that are
above the median of the sector.
Theoretical works about reference points state that these
points are inMuenced by the overall context of experience
[30, p. 8], [40, p. 65]. Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel [49]
propose that past, present and future performance, as well as
internal and external reference dimensions, form a strategic
reference point matrix. Moreover, the focus of attention can
make one reference point dominate over others, explaining
the di<erences in risk taking [40, p. 65]. This fact can explain
the di<erences between two di<erent theories: prospect the-
ory and threat-rigidity theory [50]. This latter theory postu-
lates that the lower the performance of a 1rm, the lower the
risk assumed by its managers. This behavior could be the re-
sult of establishing the distress point as the reference point:
the 1rm would be above the distress point, so the managers
will not take risks that could end the 1rm. Therefore, the
relationship could be caused by a di<erent reference point
instead of a di<erent risk-return pattern [40, p. 65], [27, p.
477]. Finally, following these arguments, some authors have
tried to 1nd the reference point for a 1rm by identifying the
level of minimal risk in the quadratic equation that relates
performance and risk in behavioral and prospect theories
[38,40].
The second problem is the cross-sectional design. In the
same manner as prospect theory’s authors, scholars have
used 1rm-speci1c longitudinal analysis to test behavioral
theory, obtaining support for behavioral theory hypotheses
[48].
Finally, Palmer and Wiseman [48] dealt with the
di<erentiation between managerial risk taking and 1rm risk,
measuring them separately. Their results also supported
behavioral theory.
3.2. Strategic position and competitive advantage
The relationship between risk and return can arise from
the di<erent strategic positions of the 1rms. A good 1rm
management could achieve not only higher return, but also
lower risk. Thus, market power, consumer orientation, and
diversi1cation strategy can produce high performance–low
risk investments [2, pp. 25,26].
Researchers have studied these di<erences from three
basic points of view: 1rm diversi1cation, market power, and
the inMuence of previous risk over performance. Table 4
shows the works included in this group.
3.2.1. Diversi<cation strategy
The theoretical relationship between risk and return at the
1rm level can depend on the product diversi1cation strat-
egy of the 1rm. Thus, 1rms that follow an unrelated diver-
si1cation strategy would — in theory — face a relatively
low risk level because the relation among its businesses is
low. Then, the covariance among these businesses’ returns
is near to zero or negative, reducing the whole 1rm’s risk
[23, p. 257, 20, p. 273]. Its expected return will be low too,
because the weak relations among the business units do not
allow them to reach synergies or share resources. Besides,
the most common method for achieving an unrelated di-
versi1cation pattern is by buying businesses in the market,
which means that the assets of these businesses are highly
priced. Return calculated on this high base will therefore be
lower [23, p. 257, 20, p. 273]. Hence, these 1rms present a
theoretical positive relationship between risk and return: a
high variance business (high risk business) will be bought
only if the expected return is also high.
Firms with related diversi1cation will achieve a di<erent
risk–return pattern. The relationships among the businesses
of the 1rm will theoretically involve greater risk because
of the high correlation. Nevertheless, expected return will
also be high, because such relationships will allow syner-
gies among the business units. This diversi1cation pattern
is commonly achieved by developing the business into the
1rm, so assets will be priced lower than they would be if the
business were bought in the market [23, p. 258]. The possi-
bility of sharing managers’ skills among related businesses
can a<ect risk as well as return. Sharing manager skills and
resources can lead to a lower risk for the 1rm. Hence, the re-
lationship between risk and return would be less clear from
this diversi1cation pattern.
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Table 3
Focus on behavioral theory
Researchers Measures Sample Results
Return Risk Expectations and
aspirations
Slack Firms Industries Source Period Relationship
Singh [41] ROE, ROA
subjective in-
dex
Subjective index Absorbed slack:
selling, general
and administra-
tive expenses and
working capital to
sales; unabsorbed
slack: cash over
current liabilities
64 Not
mentioned
Khandwalla’s ques-
tionnaire, Moody’s
industrial, transporta-
tion, public utility
and OTC industrial
manuals
1973–
1975
Direct negative be-
tween risk and return;
signi1cant support for
behavioral theory
Bormiley [42] ROE, ROA,
Return on
sales
Variances of fore-
casted earnings
Expectations by
the mean of earn-
ings forecast; as-
pirations based on
past performance
and industy mean
Current ratio,
SG&A over sales,
debt to equity,
interest coverage
ratio
288 Not
mentioned
Compustat and IBES 1976–
1987
Negative between risk
and return; signi1cant
support for behavioral
theory
Miller and
Leiblein [45]
ROE, ROA Standard deviation
and 1rst and sec-
ond order low mo-
mentums
Aspirations based
on previous per-
formance, average
performance of
the industry and
loss aversion
Accounts receiv-
able over sales;
inventories over
sales; SG&A over
sales
Not
mentioned
Not
mentioned
Compustat 1971–
1991
More statistical sig-
ni1cance with parrtial
moments. Positive in-
Muence of risk on re-
turn and negative of
return on risk; signif-
icant support for be-
havioral theory
Wiseman and
Bromiley [46]
ROE, ROA
and Return on
sales
Variance of fore-
casted incomes
Aspirations based
on the industry av-
erage performance
for low perform-
ers and on the pre-
vious performance
for high perform-
ers
Current ratio,
SG&A over sales,
debt to equity
ratio and interest
coverage ratio
323 Food
processing and
manufacturing
industries
Compustat and IBES 1975–
1988
Organizational
decline increases
risk-taking; risk tak-
ing reduces subse-
quent performance
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Wiseman and
Catanach [47]
Operating cash
Mow to total
assets
Realized credit
risk, realized
interest-rate risk
and realized
liquidity risk
Not mentioned SG&A to assets
SG&A to assets2
From 3544
to 2586
1 Department of Labor
Statistics and Thrift
Financial Reports
1979–
1988
Support for behav-
ioral hypotheses even
when agency-based
inMuences are con-
trolled for
Greve [43] Audience
share
Organizational
changes
Aspirations based
on previous per-
formance and av-
erage of the per-
formance of the
industry
160 1 Arbitron 1984–
1992
High performance
reduces the change
likelihood; signi1cant
support for behavioral
theory
Palmer and
Wiseman [48]
ROA and ROE Variance in ROA,
Variance in PER,
R&D expendi-
ture, diversi1ca-
tion indicators
Aspirations based
on the average re-
turn of the indus-
try for low per-
formers; based on
the previous re-
turns for high per-
formers
Quick ratio,
administrative
and operational
expenses to
sales, debt to
equity ratio
235 64 Compustat 1984–
1991
Support for behavioral
explanation of risk
Deephouse
and Wiseman
[27]
ROA Variance of
forecasted
incomes
Expectations us-
ing the average
forecast of earn-
ings per share; as-
pirations using the
greater of industry
average return for
the prior year or
the 1rm’s actual
return in the prior
year plus a 1ve
percent growth
factor
Current ratio
SG&A on sales
Debt to
equity ratio
367 and
695
Compustat
and IBES
1973–
1977
1978–
1982
1983–
1987
Signi1cant support
for behavioral the-
ory. Weak support
for Agency Theory.
Strong inMuence of
the economic envi-
ronment on the
risk–return relation
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Table 4
Focus on strategic position
Researchers Theory Measures Sample Results
Return Risk Firms Industries Source Period Relationship
Bettis and
Hall [23]
Diversi1cation ROA Standard deviation
of ROA
80 Not mentioned Compustat 1973–1977 Positive association for non
related diversi1cation strategy
1rms; negative association for re-
lated diversi1cation
Bettis and
Mahajan [24]
Diversi1cation ROA Standard deviation
of ROA
80 Not mentioned Compustat 1973–1977 Related diversi1cation 1rms are
in negative relation cluster;
non-related are in positive rela-
tion clusters
Amit and
Livnat [51]
Diversi1cation Funds from opera-
tions over assets
Standard deviation
of return
400 Not mentioned Compustat 1977–1984 Most of the 1rms show positive
relationship. No support for the
Paradox
Chang and
Thomas [20]
Diversi1cation ROA and ROA2 ROA variance 64 Not mentioned Compustat I
and II
1977–1981 No impact of diversi1cation on
strategic risk
Cool et al. [25] Market power ROA, return on
sales, average re-
turn on assets
Standard deviation
of return measures
21 1 Census of
Manufacturing
Indiana Banks
1975–1979 Positive between risk and re-
turn, negative between market
share and return, negative be-
tween market share and risk
Miller and
Bromiley [26]
Adjustment costs
and default risk
ROE and ROA Measures from
factorial analysis;
income variability,
market risk and
strategic risk
526 746 Not mentioned Compustat and
CRSP
1978–1982
1983–1987
Support for the negative inMuence
of risk over subsequent return
Kim et al. [52] Diversi1cation Industry ROA Industry standard
deviation of ROA
125 Not mentioned Compustat 1982–1986 Global market diversi1cation in-
creases returns and reduces risk;
risk–return trade o< found for
product diversi1cation
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Despite these theoretical relations, the empirical tests of
these hypotheses do not strongly support them. Related 1rms
achieved, on average, higher return at a lower risk, but there
was no causal relationship between diversi1cation strategy
and risk–return relationship [23,24]. Product diversi1cation
seems to have little impact on the negative risk–return rela-
tion [20,52] or no inMuence at all [51].
Kim et al. [52] found a positive relationship between
multinational diversi1cation and return, as well as a negative
relation between multinational diversi1cation and risk. They
concluded that, once the industry e<ect is controlled, multi-
national diversi1cation can produce the Bowman’s paradox.
3.2.2. Market power
Another factor that can inMuence the risk–return relation-
ship is the market power of the 1rm. The theoretical link
between market power and return has been considered pos-
itive, for reasons such as brand 1delity, economies of scale,
experience curve e<ects, and greater bargaining power with
suppliers and distributors [53, p. 149]. A high market power
1rm could also get lower risk because 1rms with greater
market power can pass their risk on to customers or suppli-
ers [53, p. 151] instead of their stockholders.
Market power has been directly related to return and in-
versely related to risk, so it may be considered one of the pos-
sible causes of Bowman’s paradox. However, empirical re-
sults do not suSciently support the former explanation. Sev-
eral works acknowledge the positive relationship between
return and market power, but, as Woo [53, p. 149] points
out, other studies have also acknowledged insigni1cant rela-
tionships after third factors common to both variables have
been removed. Concerning the market power–risk relation,
Woo [53] shows that it was dependent on the risk measure
used and the industry selected. The results for accounting
risk (ROA variance) were not signi1cant in this study.
When Cool et al. [25] tested the relationship between
return, risk and market power, their results supported the
former hypotheses: market power is positively related to
return and inversely related to risk. However, they also found
a direct relationship between risk and return.
In brief, these ambiguous results indicate that the role of
market power has not been thoroughly tested empirically.
Hence, research on this area should continue.
3.2.3. The impact of previous risk on return
The main focus of scholars who have studied Bowman’s
paradox has been the inMuence of the expected return on
the managerial risk taking. This is the focus employed in
those works that use prospect or behavioral theories as back-
ground. Nevertheless, the risk level can also inMuence the
performance level of a 1rm. Two arguments support this risk
inMuence on the latter return: default risk and adjustment
costs.
The 1rst argues that variability in performance increases a
1rm’s default risk, because this variability also increases the
likelihood that a 1rm will default on its explicit or implicit
commitments. Hence, customers, suppliers and employees
will require a monetary incentive to induce them into a trans-
action [26, p. 766]. The adjustment costs argument says that
high variability in sales makes eScient utilization of capital
diScult, and hence increases costs [26, p. 767].
This focus has been little employed to date, but its hy-
potheses have been signi1cantly supported. For example,
Miller and Bromiley [26] found that their data supported
this focus instead of Prospect theory hypotheses. Similar re-
sults were achieved by Bromiley [42], although this study
was based on behavioral theory [22]. Deephouse and Wise-
man [27] and Veliyath and Ferris [14] also employed the
default risk argument as a theoretical background, 1nding a
negative inMuence of risk on the latter return.
Finally, Miller and Leiblein [45] studied the inMuence of
risk on subsequent performance, 1nding a positive inMuence
of the 1rst on the latter, contrary to default risk hypothesis.
The explanation is that they tested the inMuence on the long
run, while Bromiley [42] studied the inMuence on a shorter
period of time.
4. Criticisms of the methodology in organization theory
Some scholars point out that Bowman’s paradox can only
be the result of some methodological mistake that biases the
real relationship between risk and return. We now survey
works grouped into three categories of criticisms: statisti-
cal measures, sample and accounting data reliability. These
works are shown in Table 5.
4.1. Statistical measures
Most criticisms of Bowman’s paradox studies have fo-
cused on the statistical measures used in the research.
Bowman’s paradox is centered on the relationship between
the accounting variables of return and risk. Hence, most ar-
ticles have used accounting ratios to measure them. For ex-
ample, to measure return, researchers have mainly employed
the average of ROA, ROE, or pro1t over sales. The main
risk measures have been the variances of the return vari-
ables, though some researchers have used other measures,
as analysts forecast variance, R&D cost or advertising cost.
Criticisms have been made about both expected return and
risk measures, although the latter have been more important.
The 1rst problem is caused by cross-sectional analysis. Thus,
using this methodology, the risk is measured ex-post, but
not ex-ante [2, p. 18], [9, p. 168]. Some scholars have tried
to avoid this problem by using lagged models [45,32,42] to
prove causal relationships between risk and return from dif-
ferent periods, or employing ex-ante measures of risk, such
as the variability of earnings forecasts [42], questionnaire
information [41], or the risk aversion coeScient obtained
from a theoretical utility function [62].
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Table 5
Empirical criticisms to Bowman’s paradox works
Researchers Criticisms Measures Sample Results
Return Risk Firms Industries Source Period Relationship
Marsh and
Swanson [54]
Statistical measures Transformed ROE Variance of
transformed ROE
175 10 Ross Watts and
Value Line
1958–1981 Both relationships, but
most of them are not
signi1cant
Fiegenbaum and
Thomas [55]
Temporal stability ROE ROE variance Between 345
and 700
7 Value Line and
Compustat
1960–
1979
Negative on 1970s
and positive on 1960s
Fiegenbaum and
Thomas [13]
Temporal stability,
market risk
ROE ROE variance and
CAPM beta
Between 1283
and 2394
35 to 76 Compustat 1960–
1979
Negative on 1970s
and positive on 1960s;
not signi1cant with
market measures
Aaker and
Jacobson [56]
Statistical measures ROI Systematic and
unsystematic risk
1376
businesses
Not
mentioned
PIMS Not
mentioned
Positive correlation
between both risks
and ROI
Fiegenbaum and
Thomas [57]
Temporal stability,
statistical measures
ROE, debt to
assets, current
ratio, sales to as-
sets
Variance of returns Not
mentioned
9 Compustat 1972–1980 Negative for stock-
holders and bondhold-
ers; overall support for
the paradox
Oviatt and
Bauerschmidt [58]
Statistical measures Logarithm of
ROE
Deviation of return
measure from a
trend line
141 8 Standard and Poor
stock report
1970–
1979
Negative using OLS;
positive using SLS
Wiseman and
Bromiley [59]
Statistical measures ROE and ROA ROE and ROA
variances and sum
of quadratic errors
from a trend line
2179 57 Compustat 1968–1987 No di<erence between
both risk measures
Collins and
RueMi [60]
Statistical measures ROA Ordinal risk measure 27 1 Not mentioned 1968–1985 Negative
Baucus
et al. [61]
Statistical measures,
temporal stability
ROA measured at
the end of the pe-
riod (EOP) and at
the beginning of
the period (BOP)
Standard deviations
of return measures
1005 35 Compustat 1969–
1988
EOP measures tend to
negative; BOP mea-
sures tend to positive;
no stable relationship
Walls and
Dyer [62]
Statistical measures ROA Risk tolerance
ratio
55 1 Oil and Gas
Journal Energy
Database
1983–1990 Substantial di<erences
between ex-ante and
ex-post measures of
risk
McNamara and
Bromiley [8]
Statistical measures Average
interest rate
charged and risk-
adjusted return
Lender’s
perceptions
1 1 Evaluations made
in a banking
division
Positive relationship
when expected re-
turns are measured
by interest rate;
negative when they
are measured with
risk-adjusted returns
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The key problem concerning the study of risk is the use
of the variance. Although widely used by researchers as a
measure of risk, there is no theory linked to it [9, p. 168].
It is questionable that the “strategic risk” could be properly
measured by the simple variance, as “risk” is a very com-
plex concept. Therefore, the paradox could be not a real
relationship between risk and return, but a mean-variance
relationship, where the variance is a bad indicator for risk
[45,56,63–65].
The theoretical discussion of variance as a risk indicator
has adopted two main postures. First, it seems that man-
agers do not use the variance when they make their deci-
sions because they are not used to the distributions of prob-
ability of the variables [64], or because they consider only
the negative variations “risky”, not the positive ones [45,9,
p. 178]. Following this argument, when Miller and Leiblein
[45] tested the relationship using measures of downside risk
they obtained support for Behavioral Theory hypotheses.
Second, contrary to the former line of thought, managers
could use variance and additional information in their risk
measuring. Other dimensions of strategic risk have been ac-
knowledged, such as the failure risk— the probability of not
reaching a target point — [65–67], the ruin risk — the prob-
ability of ruinous loss — [65–67], the size of loss [64,66],
the lack of information [66], and the innovation level of the
1rm [31,32,66]. In addition, managers should take into ac-
count the risk for all the stakeholders of the 1rm [57]. Miller
and Bromiley [26] used various risk measures in a factor
analysis, obtaining three factors for risk measure: income
variability, market risk, and strategic risk. Their analyses
obtained a negative inMuence of risk on subsequent return.
In summary, if variance is not used by managers as a
measure of risk, or if it is insuScient for measuring it,
the mean–variance relationship cannot be assimilated into
the real risk–return relationship. Nevertheless, the empirical
works that have tested the paradox using risk measures dif-
ferent from the variance of the performance have provided
signi1cant support for the paradox hypotheses [45,31] sim-
ilar to the variance.
A third criticism of variance is that this measure can bias
the results if used on a sample whose results are part of a
trend. Thus, 1rms in an industry whose sales are growing
or declining would have higher variances and, hence, higher
estimated risk. Nevertheless, the relationship between return
and risk measured with the errors on a regression line has
been tested, and the results do not di<er signi1cantly from
the variance studies [58,59].
The last criticism of risk is the possible statistical rela-
tionship between the mean and the variance of the same
variable. By measuring return as the average of pro1tabil-
ity, and risk as a variance of pro1tability, we are relating
two moments of the same random variable. The relationship
between risk and return could be only a statistical relation-
ship between those two moments, not a real economic rela-
tionship between risk and return. One of the most common
hypotheses to avoid this problem is to consider that 1rm
pro1tability is normally distributed, and then mean and vari-
ance are not statistically related. However, accounting ratio
distributions studies show that these variables are not nor-
mally distributed, and their probability distributions are sim-
ilar to log-normal or gamma distributions [54, p. 37]. Thus,
mean and variance would be statistically related by the dis-
tribution of the random variable.
Another problem with the mean–variance relationship is
its dependence on the aggregation period chosen [68–70].
Thus, a negative relationship in a period T could be obtained
from positive relationships in sub-periods of T [68]. Hence,
the mean–variance approach would not be useful in deter-
mining the real relationship between risk and return, as any
relationship can be caused by relationships of any sign in
lower periods or can cause any sign relationships in higher
periods.
The stability of the pro1tability distribution is also a key
issue in the empirical research [68, p. 371] because the re-
lationship between pro1tability and time can be the result
of elements drawn from a single risk-return relationship or
from various mean–variance relationships caused by dif-
ferent pro1tability distributions throughout time. Since es-
timations of variance and mean are meaningful only for
stationary time-series of returns [40, p. 63], an initial hy-
pothesis should be the stability of the return distribution,
although this hypothesis is questionable for the analysis of
long time-periods [71, p. 208].
To avoid the e<ects of non-stationary time-series, the pe-
riod analyzed by the researchers has been relatively short
(1ve-year periods) [40, p. 67], but this short period makes
the inMuence of extreme observations greater, which can pro-
duce similar results to Prospect Theory or Behavioral theory
hypotheses. Let us consider a 1rm with expected return M
and variance V for the 1ve-year period. Let us assume that,
in one of the 1ve years, the 1rm obtains an extremely low
(high) result. If we try to measure M and V using the 1ve
observations, the extreme observation will imply a higher
variance and a lower (higher) expectation. The result is the
same as that predicted by Prospect and Behavioral theories:
if a 1rm obtains an extremely low value, its mean will be
low (below the target) and its variance will be high, that is
to say, low return and high variance; on the other hand, if
the extreme value is high, the mean will also be high (above
the target) and the variance will be high as well, that is to
say, high return and high variance. In summary, the nega-
tive relationship below the reference point or the positive
relationship above it can be simply produced by 1rms with
extremely low or extremely high observations.
Return measures have been questioned less than risk mea-
sures although the accounting ratios of pro1tability present
some defects that bring into question their quality as indi-
cators of return: they relate the earnings of the period with
investments or net worth, but these denominators can also
inMuence future earnings [56, p. 283].
The main criticism of the pro1tability measure is based on
the measurement of the denominator of the ratio at the end
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of the period [61]. Accounting ratios such as ROE or ROA,
which use end of the period (EOP) measures — book value
or total assets measured at the end of the period — have
been used in almost all the empirical studies. This fact tends
to present a negative relationship between pro1tability ratio
and its variance: 1rms that have achieved an extraordinarily
high pro1t — high return — increase book value too. If we
use this variable at the end of the period, the denominator
of the ratio will be higher, and therefore, the ratio itself and
its variance will be lower. If the 1rm obtained high losses
— low return — the book value measured at the end of the
period will be lower and, hence, the ratio and its variance
will be higher [61, p. 390].
4.2. Sample criticisms
One of the methodological problems researchers have to
confront is the sample selection. In the 1rst place, it is pos-
sible that the relationship found by Bowman was only a
short-term relationship, being a real positive correlation be-
tween risk and return in the long term as the 1nancial eco-
nomic theory states [2, p. 27]. This idea led researchers to
employ samples from diverse time periods to study the sta-
bility of the negative relationship, and 1nd both negative
and positive relationships depending on the period of time
chosen [55,13]. Despite this, no longitudinal study has ex-
amined this temporal instability.
Another problem related to sample selection is the indus-
try classi1cation. It has been demonstrated that the industry
e<ect on the risk–return pattern is very important [45, p. 99].
Thus, features like concentration degree, and position in life
cycle are key variables in the relationship between risk and
return of the 1rms [2, p. 27, 13, p. 400].
5. Conclusions and future research
Although many works provide evidence of the negative
relationship between the accounting measures of risk and
return, none are free from criticism because they have not
resolved all their problems at the same time. The correct
measure of “risk”, the stability of the relationship, or the
cross-sectional design of the research are weak points of
nearly all the works that have been overcome independently.
Nevertheless, it can be said that investigation in this area
is progressing, mainly in the area of risk measures. In this
sense, the literature has proved that the traditional variability
measures — the variance and its derivatives — present im-
portant methodological problems in relation to the mean of
the variable. Perhaps the strongest criticisms are that there
are problems of identi1cation because mean and variance
come from the same variable, and that the variance is mea-
sured ex-post (historical) when it should be ex-ante (expec-
tation) [9]. Although there is no methodological solution in
the papers on Bowman’s paradox to date, both problems can
be solved using GARCH models, in which mean and vari-
ance are de1ned by di<erent equations. Besides solving the
problem of identi1cation, this model can estimate forward
variances equal to the mean. Nevertheless, for accounting
data, it is necessary to recognize that we could 1nd a re-
striction in relation to the small number of observations.
The solution applied to this problem is the search for new
measures of risk, di<erent from the traditional variance or
variance-related measures. Some examples of the new kind
of risk measures could be downsize measures [45], ordinal
risk measures [60], content analysis measured risk [32,39],
the mean of the quadratic changes in performance [40], or
the variance of forecasted incomes [42,46,27]. Another fo-
cus has been the direct measure of the manager’s risk per-
ception, using questionnaires [41,47,8]. Finally, some au-
thors use proxies for measuring managerial risk taking, such
as the R&D expenditure or debt to equity ratio [26,48]. The
results achieved when these new measures are used often
show a negative relationship between risk and return, sup-
porting the hypothesis from the paradox, if other criticisms
are not considered. Nevertheless, these measures are still
rarely studied, and have their own problems. Therefore, re-
search of more suitable ways for measuring risk is vital for
the development of this stream of investigation [9].
As we mentioned in the introduction, from Fama and
French [1], the theoretical positive relationship between risk
(beta) and return at the market level has been challenged.
Several authors have tried to demonstrate that the death of
beta has been exaggerated [4,5] because there still exists a
positive relationship between beta and return; other authors
support the result found by Fama and French [1], proving
that there is no correlation between beta and returns [11];
and 1nally, other authors have stated that the relationship be-
tween both measures depends on the situation of the market
expected return, above or below the risk-free return [3,6]. It
is amazing how this evolution in 1nancial economics theory
is almost identical to the evolution of Bowman’s paradox,
although it is surprising that there is no mention in these 1-
nancial works to the previous Bowman’s paradox literature.
In this sense, some 1nancial authors are starting the search
for new measures of risk that substitute or complement the
beta from the CAPM [12]. Between these new measures,
the accounting measures have the most relevant position.
We think that these two research lines that to date have
been mutually ignored, with the exceptions of Fiegenbaum
and Thomas [13], Veliyath and Ferris [14], Chatterjee et al.
[15], and RueMi et al. [9], should be integrated in a wider
frame for researching the relationship between risk and
return.
This inter-disciplinary focus must also be extended to-
wards accounting research, since most of the measures used
in Bowman’s paradox, and the new risk measures for the 1-
nancial works, come from the accounting information. The
development of reliable methods of measuring accounting
risk is vital for the progress of this line of research.
Finally, the inter-disciplinary focus is necessary for re-
searching some lags in Bowman’s paradox. In this sense, we
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mention the reliability of the accounting measures, since a
common criticism of accounting information research is the
relative reliability of these measures. Accounting scholars
have demonstrated that some accounting practices, known as
“earnings management”, can inMuence reported income, pre-
senting a distorted picture of 1rm performance. Bowman [2,
p. 25] pointed out that the paradox could be only the result of
these practices among the high-performing 1rms. Although
various works have tested Bowman’s paradox hypotheses
using measures di<erent from accounting indicators
[42,46,27,41,47,8], or accounting measures less suscepti-
ble to manipulation [36], to date no study has tested the
possible e<ect of earnings management practices on the
risk–return relationship. In this sense, it is interesting to
observe how prospect theory has been employed to ex-
plain both Bowman’s paradox and earnings management
[72,73].
A second lag in Bowman’s paradox literature is the
so-called “masking e<ect” of the market, that is, how the
accounting risk–return relationship inMuences the market
relation. Scholars have hardly studied this issue, and their
results are contradictory. In his 1rst work, Bowman [2] hy-
pothesized that the market could mask the paradox through
the price mechanism. On one hand, those 1rms with high
accounting returns and low variance would be highly priced
at the market, which would produce lower rates of return
and risk. On the other hand, 1rms with low accounting
returns and high variance would be lowly priced at the
market, and this price would allow higher returns and vari-
ability. This “masking e<ect” was tested by Fiegenbaum
and Thomas [13] by relating the accounting return with a
market risk measure (this measure was the beta parameter
from the CAPM). They found a signi1cant positive rela-
tionship between beta and accounting return and, based on
this result, concluded that the market masked the paradox.
Nevertheless, there is a contradiction between Bowman’s
argument [2] and Fiegenbaum and Thomas’ results [13]:
while Bowman’s argument implies a negative relationship
between accounting return and both market measures (high
accounting returns imply high price and hence, low market
Table 6
Number of citations of the reviewed articles from 1992 to February
2001
Author 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Bowman [2] 5 3 4 2 9 5 6 4 4 42
Bowman [31] 3 7 3 1 7 5 5 5 2 38
Bettis, Hall [23] 9 5 5 1 4 4 3 1 2 1 35
Bowman [32] 5 2 3 6 1 2 3 22
Marsh, Swanson [54] 1 1 3 5
Bettis, Mahajan [24] 4 4 4 1 3 5 1 2 2 26
Fiegenbaum, Thomas [55] 1 1 1 2 1 6
Fiegenbaum, Thomas [13] 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 16
Singh [41] 6 4 11 6 14 14 9 2 8 74
Aaker, Jacobson [56] 1 3 4 1 1 2 2 14
risk and return) and a positive relationship between account-
ing risk and market measures (the higher the accounting
risk, the lower the price and hence, the higher market return
and risk), Fiegenbaum and Thomas [13] found a positive
relationship between accounting returns and market risk. In
another work, Veliyath and Ferris [14] found a signi1cant
negative relationship between accounting return and total
market risk, but no signi1cant relationship between account-
ing return and systematic risk (measured by the beta from
the CAPM model). In conclusion, it is not clear how the
accounting risk-return relationship inMuences the market re-
lation, and it should be studied as part of the new research
about the market risk–return relationship. It is important that
the 1nancial stream of Fama and French [1] contributes with
its own conclusions.
Lastly, most of the empirical tests that have supported
the existence of the paradox are cross-sectional. This cre-
ates the following problems: (1) the temporal evolution
of the relationship is not well tested, so di<erent relation-
ships can arise, as in Fiegenbaum and Thomas [55,13];
and (2) it is possible that the variation in risk taking
across 1rms stems from established di<erences among them
that also produce di<erences in their successes [2, p. 6].
Again, a new methodology could solve these problems.
The use of dynamic statistical techniques such as “panel
data” could solve both problems. We can better understand
the evolution of the relationship with time, and we can
also examine whether the risk-return relationship depends
mainly on the attitude towards risk of every manager or
the established di<erences among 1rms through the whole
market.
Appendix A
Empirical risk–return papers before Bowman [2], focus
on prospect theory, behavioral theory, strategic position, em-
pirical criticisms to Bowman’s paradox works, and number
of citations of the reviewed articles are given in Tables 1–
6, respectively.
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Table 6 (continued)
Author 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Fiegenbaum, Thomas [34] 4 3 7 1 8 3 2 7 3 1 39
Amit, Livnat [51] 3 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 24
Cool et al. [25] 1 1 1 2 4 4 1 6 3 23
Chang, Thomas [20] 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 11
Fiegenbaum [35] 1 1 5 3 5 1 1 17
Miller, Bromiley [26] 4 2 4 5 5 1 2 3 26
Jegers [36] 1 1 4 1 1 1 9
Bromiley [42] 2 3 2 1 11 7 7 9 4 1 47
Oviatt, Bauerschmidt [58] 1 1 2 1 2 7
Wiseman, Bromiley [59] 1 2 1 2 3 1 10
Collins, RueMi [60] 1 1 2 1 5
Kim, Hwang, Burgers [52] 2 1 2 1 4 10
Baucus, Golec, Cooper [61] 2 1 1 1 5
Sinha [37] 1 1
Miller, Leiblein [45] 1 4 3 2 1 11
Wiseman, Bromiley [46] 1 2 3
Gooding et al. [38] 1 1
Walls, Dyer [62] 1 1
Lee [39] 1 1
Wiseman, Catanach [47] 2 1 3
Greve [43] 1 3 3 7
McNamara, Bromiley [8] 0
Palmer, Wiseman [48] 0
Deephouse, Wiseman [27] 0
Lehner [40] 0
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